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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BLISS S. EL~fER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-\'S.-
A. IL l\IORTENSEN, cl/h/a 
A. H. l\[ORTENSI~N PLUMBING 
& HEATING COJ\IP ANY, 
Defenr/a.nt and Appellant. 
Case 
No.10915 
Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
STATE~£ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
As was stated by appellant, this is an action for 
personal injuries suffered by plaintiff resulting from 
the nci.digence of defendant's employee at a construction 
~i1e i11 Spri11gTille, Utah on April 3, 1964. 
DISPOSITION IX THE LOWER COURT 
Tht' ease was tried to a jury in the District Court 
11!' Ftah County, and resulted in a Yerdict in favor of 
t l1P pla i111 iff i11 the amount of $45,000.00. 
1 
RELIEF SOFGH'l' ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks that the jury verdict and judgmr•ii\ 
on the verdict be affirmed. 
STATE,'\lENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff agrees substantially with the statement 
of facts as set forth in appellant's brief, but wishes to 
add the following: 
On the day of the accident, plain tiff ,,·as working 
with a crew of men pouriug portions of th<> eoncretP 
slab floor on the construction project. Dcfeudant and 
his employees were i11 another area ()f the 1milcling doing 
plumbing work. The cernrnt pour on the clay of the 
accident had been completecl, and )ilarion Elmer, plain-
tiff's brother, was instructed to get the wire mesh reauy 
for the next pour which was to be the following U.ay 
(T-30). This necessitated cutting 32-foot strips from 
1 
the heavy rolls of wire mesh. As indicated in appellant's 
brief, this was done inside the building in the area near 
the entrance, and the wire mesh was placed in layers 
on top of each other as they were cut. There were four 
1 
lengths of wire cut and stacked on top of each other 
at the time of the accident. 
Appellant states in his brief tliat plaintiff admitted 
that the wire could have been rolled out in another area. 
However, the record shows that the rolls weighed 250 
lbs. and could not be easily moved by the man doing the 
cutting; that it was easier to do the work near the driw-
way because of the terrain: that no trucks were being 
<'xpecte<l to use the driveway that afternoon, and that 
the entire operation of cutting wire would take only 
npproximately one-half hour; and that even with the 
win• laid out, there was ample room for trucks to pass 
( rr-:J9, 90, 91, 121, 122). 
Defendant's truck was located inside the building, 
awl apparently it became necessary for him to send one 
of the rmployees back to the shop for a plumbing part. 
,\s the trurk approached the driveway area where the 
"·in• \ms stacked, plaintiff stood on the wire and held 
the ronwr down with a two-by-four. The purpose of 
tloillg this was to provide a marker for the driver to 
watch so he could avoid hitting the wire (T-102); also 
to hold the "·ire down so it woul<ln 't get caught by the 
trnek in the t>vent the truck got too close (T-116). Plain-
tiff tl1e11 directed the driver who had stopped to "come 
oYPr it slow''. 
At this point, the driver completely ignored the 
din·ctiuns giYen him and re\'Ved his motor and acceler-
ate-cl. One eye witness described what happened as 
follows: 
"Then it was fast. Before the truck moved, the 
wheels started to move and throw gravel. And 
then he revved the motor. The next thing I heard 
is Bliss holler, and as I looked at him, he was in 
the air higher than I could reach, and then he 
landed out here and ·was dragged with the wire 
hefore the truck stopped." (T-123) 
The drin•r of the defendant's truck, after revvmg 
l1i:-; e11g-i11e, and spinning his wheels, drove onto the wire 
nt a completely unreasonable speed, hooking the wire 
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and travelling a total distance of approximately three 
or four car lengths before stopping (T-47, 48, 124, 126, 
128). The plaintiff described the driving of the truck 
as follows: "vVell, he speeded it up, awl in that grawl 
it spun the wheels, and he shot out of there likl' he wa,, 
going to a fire." ( T-39) The plaintiff had his foet 
jerked out from underneath him (T-282), had two rolls 
of wire wadded over him, and was dragged outside the 
building ( T-124). The def enclant 's fon•man, Clyde 1\Ior-
tensen, testified that he probably told the driver of the 
truck to hurry as he left to get the part that '""~ 
needed by the plumbers (T-278). The foreman, ClyclP 
Mortensen, further testified that he ohsened the trmk 
leave the building, that it was loaded heavily with plumb-
ing equipment, and observed the hack of the truek bounce 
and settle at least 10 inc hes ( T-281). He observed the 
truck bounce in this manner from his iiosition in the 
northwest corner of the building about 100 feet away 
and sa\v the plaintiff's feet jerk out from underneath 
him and ran to the scene yelling at the truck clrinr. 
''Don't you know you han' a man on the back of this ' 
truck?" ( T-282, 284) 
Appellant states in his brief that plaintiff aclmit1rd 
that he could have gotten a larger stick to hold the wire 
down, and therefore not have been required to stand 011 
the wire at all. The evidence shows that he stoo(l on , 
the wire in order to hold both corners down, and that 
there were not any longer sticks in the immediate area 
(T-105, 106). The plaintiff, l\Ir. Elmer, did not lieliP\'C' 
it to be reasonably necessary to go to great lengths to 
take any further precautions ('11-U3) obviously because 
4 
hacl the driver clone as directed and driven slow, there 
\l'onlcl have bee11 no reason to anticipate any danger, 
c\'l'll if t lie truck were to catch the wire. 
Respondent agT('eS fully with appellant's statement 
of fads relating to damages iu that plaintiff suffered 
,~Prions injuries to his hack requiring lumbro-sacral 
fusions. He is 58 yearn of age and has received a 30% 
loss of body function. The injuries are permanent. 
Actually four vertebrae were fused together hegin-
uing with L-3 to the sacrum, which means a total fusion 
nrnl soli(] backbone from the plaintiff's waist to his 
sacrum (T-158). The orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Charles 
Rmitl1, .Jr., testified that a handful and a-half of bone 
r·hips were taken from the plaintiff's hip in order to 
fnst• these several vrrtebrae together in an operation 
that rcquire(l five hours (T-158-160). The successful 
fusion of the n 1 rtehrae results in total loss of movement 
in that part of the spine that is fused and eliminates 
11rrn• root irritation ancl pai11 (T-159). Unfortunately 
tlit> plaintiff did not obtain a satisfactory or successful 
fusion in all areas. The attempted fusion between L-3 
and L-4 nrtebrae resulted in a failure of fusion or 
contimwcl monment (T-166, 167). The result of the 
fusion failure leans the same symptoms that neces-
sitated tlw plaintiff to submit to surgery originally, 
name!~·, 11cn·e root irritation, the continuation of pain, 
nml a loss of function ( T-167). The result of the failure 
to fusp left tlH' plaintiff with pseudarthrosis, a false 
j1Ji11t or an incomplete fusion (T-172). For this reason 
th<· plaintiff was given a whole body permanent <lisa-
hilit~, rating of thirty (30%) percent and the doctor has 
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lll'V<:>r he0n able to release the plaintiff to return to 
earpL•ntry work (T-179). Dr. Smith further testified 
that ht> ditl not Sl'l' how the plaintiff coulcl l'SCape the 
l'Yl'11hmlity of having future acMitio11al surg-ery to eor. 
rect the incomplete fusion (T-173). He estimated futurl' 
nwdical and hospital 0xpenses to he approximatrh 
$~,000.00, with a future work loss of approximately ~ix 
mouths (T-176). 
Prior to the aeeident his rneome as a carpenkr wa~ 
$7,000.00 iwr year. Because of his permanent injury, 
he eannot do carpentry work in tl1e future. He has tried 
to seek other employment, and no\\· earns $-1.800.00 p0r 
yt•ar, which is the hig-hest paid job a\·ailahle to him. His 
loss of t'arnings to the date of the· trial wa:' $10,530.00. 
\[t>dieal expenses prior to trial \\·ere ~~.-ri:L>O. 
~.\.RGF~IEXT 
POIXT I 
THERE "\\ ~.\.S XO PRE.TrDIC'L.\.L ERROR 
lN THE corRT'S IXSTRrCTIOXS TO 
THE .TrRY . 
. \pp1.'llant in his hri1.'f has citl'd mmwrous l·asPs, all 
l'l'l'itin~ and nplwlding- th1.' g"l'IH'r<ll pri1ll:·ipl1.' that it iR 
t'l"J"t)J" for tlw trial court h) i11st nwt a jury in ..:11ch a 
nrnn111.'r as tt) dt'prin' a party l)f his tl11c't)ry lir' thl' en~c 
if said tht'tll')" is supptnh'd !)y tht• t'\-ith>i:,·t>. Pl<1i11tiff 
and l"l'Sjhllldt'll( takt'S 1)() l'Xl't'ptitlll Tl) :L:..: : ..'."-'!lt'!';I! pri11-
(0iplt'. t'I" !t) tht' ht)ldin~s ,)t' an;- t)t' th' ,·;1,..L'S t·it1•d 111 
t'tllll\St'l. Tht'St' ,·;!St's dt' 11,)t i:1,-,);,-l. r'ad ,:::;:1~i 1 )1l' f'\l'll 
remote]>· similar to the instant case. None of them are 
npplirnhle here; 11or was c1efenclm1t deprived of his 
t!Jenn· of the case. 
Defrndant 's specific objection goes to Instruction 
~ o. 1 l "·herein he claims said instruction "restricts 
defendant to two grounds of contributory negligence 
and i11 effect tells the jury that the standing on the wir0 
11hile th(• truck was driven over it, as a matter of law, 
11·ould not be suffici0nt evidence from which the jury 
r·onlc1 find that thr plaintiff was contributorily negli-
gent.'' f.;uch an implication simply cannot be read into 
this instruction. Under Instruction No. 11, the jury 
1rnf' pt•rmittc>d to consider the issues of contributory 
nrgligP1we in any of the following: 
'' (a) In that he failed to remove the reinforcing 
wire from the entrance of the building be-
fore allowing the truck driven by Douglas 
Dwaine Paulson to proceed. 
(h) In that he failed to maintain a proper look-
out and exercise reasonable due care for 
his own safety.'' 
l'a ragra ph ( h) a hon• does not restrict in any sens<', hut 
on the contra r~· is a broad instruction permitting tht> 
inr~ in tf frct to eonsider any reasonablr theory sup-
portl'tl h~· tlw c·,·i<lr11ee. Thrre is absolutely nothing in 
thif' lnngnagp \\·hieh says or even implies that thf' jury 
('()Hld not as a matter of law find contributory ncgligPll<'P 
fr11m tlie plaintiff's standing Oil the wire while th0 tru<'k 
11:1.~ dri1·en on•r it. 
ll!'f1·nda1tt in liis reqtwHt for i1tHfnwtionH did not 
:11 <lll\ 1 im" rr•<Jllf'st any i1tstrndio11H specifi<'ally Hdting-
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forth standing on the wire as a specific ground for con. 
t ributory negligence. Had he done so, it is \'Cry likely 
that the trial court would have given such au instruction. 
Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 11 and 12 ask 
only that contributory negligence he considered in hroai] 
terms. Having requested the jury b0 instructed in broa<l 
terms, and never having requested that the eonrt in. 
struct on any specific theory, it would s0em that defend-
ant is in no position to complain because> the court wa:-
not more specific in its instructions. So far as plailltiff 
has been alile to determine, it is m1in'rsa1ly lwld by all 
courts that if instructions are correct as far as they go, 
hut are deficient because of their generality or failure 
to reach all points of the case, a party desiri11g add[. 
tional instructions must make a request therefore (88 
C.J.S. Trial, Section 393). 
In the case of Ferguson v . .Jongsma, 10 Utah ~d 119, 
350 P.2d 404, a defendant contended that it was error 
to submit the issue of reckless disregard hy defendant 
for plaintiff's safety without also submitting the issue 
in defense of plaintiff's disregard for his own safety. 
There was no request made for submission of the latter 
issue. In rejecting the contention, the court stated as 
follows: 
''Plaintiff in proposing an instruction on his 
theory of the case is not required to also propose 
instructions setting out all the possible defenses 
thereto. If defendant's desired instructions on 
defense to any ground which would allow })lai11-
tiff to recover, he should propose them." 
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Sec also JlcKi11ley v. Wagner, 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d 
/0fi: llr1111i1frm \', Un inn Oil Cmnpany, 216 Oregon 354, 
;;;)~l P.2c1 4-40; Reed v. Simpsnn, 32 Calif. 2d 444, 196 P.2d 
888: nll holding that if a clefernlant desires an instruction 
on his theor~' of thr case, he has a duty to so request 
the ('<mrt. 
'l1 he Utah Supreme Court has held time and time 
ai.rain that instructions must he considered altogether 
nncl Yil'\\'rll with tolerance and understanding to see 
whctl1cr the hasic issues were fairly and intelligently 
prrsr11h•tl for determ!nation, and if that purpose is ac-
complishe(l, that is all that is necessary, and no verdict 
-:honld ll0 nullified for minor errors or inconsistencies 
i11 t hr instructions. H C''!JH'Ond v. D. & R. G. Railroad 
ru111 pally, 6 Utah 2d 155, :107 P.2d 1045. One instruction 
~110111<1 not he considered in isolation in order to predi-
<"atc' a claim of error upon it, hut the instructions must 
lie read nrnl urnJerstoocl as a connected whole. Taylor v. 
J11l111so11. 18 Utah 2cl 16, 414 P.2d 575. The issues should 
lw presrnted in a fair and understandable manner with 
the least possihlr instructions. Hales Y. Peterson, 11 
Utah 2d 411, ~60 P.2d 882. Instructions should be con-
sidered as a whole and in relation to facts shown by evi-
de11cr. Rn111sn11 "· Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451. 
·with the ahove rules in mind, let us examine the 
whole of the instructions in the instant case. The court 
in its Instruction No. 2 set out in detail defendant's 
daims of contributory negligence, including the claim 
that plaintiff was contributorily negligent "in failing 
to <'X Prci St' d nr ('H re for his own safety, in that he stood 
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on the wire while the truck passed over it." \Vhik· it i~ 
true that Instruction No. 3, a stock instruction, ad\·ises 
the jury that the claims of the parties as set forth iii 
Instruction No. 2 are 11ot to he co11sidered as ;1 st:1h·n1r·nt 
upon the part of the court as to what the fads arc., 
there is absolutely nothing anywhere in the instructi0118 
to tell or imply to the jury that they cannot consiuer any 
of the contentions as so set forth; Instrurtion No. ~ 
must further be considNf'd with Instruction No. l which 
explains to the jury that it is their exclusive proYinet• 
to determine thL' facts i11 the case, arnl to eonsidPr a1111 
weigh the evi<lencC' for that pnrpoS('. Inst met ion No. fi 
properly defined contributory nC'gligencP. Instruetion 
No. 11 instructed the jury that plaintiff wonlc1 hr pre-
cluded from recovery if thr jury were to find contribu-
tory negligence in any of the particulars therrin set out, 
including the broad grounds of lookout and failurr to 
rxercise due care. 
Defendant has made further attack on Instruction 
No. 11 because paragraph (b) therein defines as a 
ground of eontributory negligenee the failnn' to maiu-
tain a proper lookout ''and'' exercise dm' care for 
plaintiff's o-wn safety; defendant says that the eonrt 
should have used the word "or" rather than "arnl." In 
this case, the claim of improper lookout is tied dirrdl;· 
to the specific act of being on tlw wire. In othPr \\-ords, 
defendant claims that plaintiff should luffe maintaine<l 
a proper lookout to reasonably ohsC'rYe that the trn<'k 
was coming and thereby get off the wire. So far a~ 
respondent is aware, th(•rc \\'as no otl1er claim rnadr 
for improper lookout. 
10 
"\ 11 ad(litional instruction on contributory negli-
V"'li('P was giv(rn in Instruction No. 12. Instruction No. 
!:2 pro\·idt>s that "it was the duty of the plaintiff, Bliss 
S. }<~!mer, to use reasonable care under the circumstances 
to pn•pnre the driveway so that the truck could proceed 
across it pursuant to his instructions and to maintain a 
pn1p('l' lookout for the safety of himself and others as 
!l1L· t rurk thus procPe<le<l. The failure of the plaintiff 
tl111s to f'omlnct himself in accordance \\'ith any of the 
fon•going requirements of law would constitute con-
tributory ncgligenre on his part." Under Instruction No. 
12 it sPems clear that if the plaintiff failed to so pre-
parP th<> driveway so that the truck could not pass over 
it without eausing injury to himself, then the injury 
cans0d by standing on the wire would be attributable to 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. It is thus apparent 
that "'hf'n all of the instructions are considered as a 
"·hole, tlH• iss1ws were in fact fairly and intelligibly pre-
sented to the jury. 
En11 if it \\·0re to be assumed that the defendant 
\\·;is deprive(l of the jury considering his theory of the 
~ta11di11g on the wire as an issue of contributory negli-
~r·JH'r• (which the instructions when considered as a 
\1-holP clearly shO\\' he was not), it is difficult to see how 
<111:-· pr(•judice conld r0sult. In reaching its verdict, the 
jmy llP('l'Ssarily was required to find by a preponder-
ance of L'Videncr that the defendant's agent was negli-
g\•nt in racing the truck across the wire. The evidence 
is undisputed that tlw driver was specifically told to 
dri\-(• slow. Thr plaintiff had no legal duty whatsoever 
1,, a11tic·ipatr' any smldf'n outbreak of negligence on the 
11 
part of the driver. See Solitz v. Am111er111a11, 1G Utah 2d 
11, 395 P.2d 25; Bryant v. Stringham Stage Line, GU 
Utah 299, 208 Pac. 541. Had the driver done as directed 
' 
there is nothing in the record to show how the plaintiff 
could possibly have been injured, even if the trnek caught 
the wire. The evid0nce could not support a finding of 
contributory negligence for standing on the wire or a 
finding that such action on the part of the plai11tiff could 
have been a proximate cause of the injury. Plaintiff has 
cited no cases whatsoever which under these cireum-
t>tances would support the view that such a finding could 
be made. 
This court has stated that a venlict will 11ot lie 
overturned in the absence of a showing of error \Yhich 
is prejudicial in the sense that in its absence there is a 
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a con-
trary result. Wardell v. Jerman, 18 Utah 2d 35D, 423 
P. 2d 485. In the case at bar, defendant had a fair trial 
in every respect. Defendant presented the issues raised 
on this appeal to the trial court on a motion for new 
trial. The judge who tried the case found 110 merit i11 his 
contentions and denied the motion. This court should 
likewise affirm the verdict. 
POINT II 
THERE \VAS NO ERROR IN 8E~PA1L\TI~G 
THE LOSS OF EARNING FR();\[ 'rirn 
OTHER GENERAL .AND 8PJ1~CIAL D,Ul 
AGES, NOR IS THF~RE ANT DUPLH',\Tlll~ 
IN THE JURY'S A \VARD. 
12 
A. TJcf c11dant has no standing to attack the form of 
the verdict where he failed to make timely objec-
tirms thereto. 
Defendant complains on appeal because the trial 
court submitted a verdict form to the jury wherein the 
jur)· was asked by the trial court to make separate 
as:-<c>ssments for geueral damages, special damages and 
lu:-<s of <><nnings. Defendant uow claims that the form 
d n•rdirt was improper because it permitted a separate 
finding for loss of Parnings, when such should have been 
i11elrnkd eitl1rr as part of the general or special dam-
au:es. Y rt at no time during the trial did defendant 
mah a11y objection to the form of the verdict; nor did 
l1r ol)jed to the damage instructions of the court on the 
gT01111!1 that the i11struetions would permit a duplication 
of r1amages. 
Rn le .J. 7 ( r) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides : 
'· lf the ,-en1ict rendered is informal or insufficient, it 
mn~- ]Jp corn•ete<1 by the jury under the ackice of the 
\'OU rt, or the jury may be sent out again." In inter-
prciting this rule, the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Jorgenson v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330, 383 P.2d 934, 
~tated as follows: 
''The general and well established rule is that so 
long as the jury is functioning as such in the 
rourse of the trial and until it is discharged, it 
is subject to directions and instructions from the 
court to the end that the issues be fully tried, de-
lihera ted upon and a correct verdict rendered. 
:\ml where it is apparent that there is some pat-
l'llt error in r01mection with the verdict, the court 
may, of course, call the matter to their attention 
13 
and direct them to redeliberate. In that regard it 
has been held, sensibly and properly, that- where 
an amount is erroneously included, the court may 
direct the jury to retire and correct it.'' · 
It would seem that if there was any question on the 
part of the defendant as to the form, or the proper 
amount of the jury verdict, or any qu0stion of dupli-
cation, counsel could and should have requestel1 an~· 
such matter to be clarified under proper directions and 
instructions from the court before the jury was dis-
charged. HaYing made no such request, and having sat 
back and permitted the court to discharge the jury after 
three days of trial, defendant is not now in a position 
to raise any objection. 
In the case of Hul v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, :3i7 
P.2d 186, a party litigant claimed preju<licial error b0-
cause insurance was mentioned during the trial. No ob-
jection had been made by either party in the trial court. 
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Crockett, 
the court stated as follows: 
"But there is an insuperable difficulty with the 
plaintiff's position. His counsel let the incident 
pass without objection and without a request to 
rectify any harm he thought had been done. Fair 
play and good conscience require that he do so at 
the earliest opportunity. Tt "-ould be manifflst1~· 
unjust for a party to sit silently by, belieYing that 
prejudicial error had been committed, proceed 
with the trial to its completion, and allow the jury 
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see if he wins, 
then if he loses, come forward with a claim that 
such an error rendered the verdict a nullity. If 
this could he dorn•, proceedings after such an oc-
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currence would be in vain and thus an imposition 
npon the court, the jury an<l all concerned. The 
court will not countenance any such mockery of its 
proc<:>edings. If something occurs which the party 
thinks is wrong and so prejudicial to him that he 
thereafter cannot have a fair trial, he must make 
his objection promptly and seek redress by mov-
ing for a mistrial, or by having cautionary in-
structions given, if that is deemed adequate, or be 
held to waive whatever rights may have existed 
to do so.'' 
The above principle has been held to apply to 
claimed errors at any stage of the proceedings, and par-
tieularly to claimed defects in a jury verdict as is de-
fendant's claim here. This basic principle is set forth 
at 8!1 C .. J.S. 'frial, Section 525, as follows: 
"An error or defect in the form of a verdict is 
waived by the failure to make timely objections. 
Objection to irregularity or informality in a ver-
dict must be taken at its rendition or time of re-
turn, at the term at which the verdict is rendered, 
and before the jury are discharged, otherwise 
the objection will be deemed to have been 
waived." 
In the case of Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 
264, a defendant neither objected nor excepted to the 
forms of questions submitted in a special verdict. On 
appeal it was held that he could not later raise this as an 
isRue and claim that the questions in the verdict were 
drawn so as to confuse the jury. 
Based on the above principles of law, the record in 
this case clearly shows that defendant has waived any 
objection to the form of verdict. 
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B. There 'Was 1rn prejudicial error i11 flte form "f 
rerdict, and it is immatrrial 1!'lwtl1er loss of ean1_ 
ings is a11 item of gc11eral or s;;r·cial rlamaqes. 
Defendant iu his brief has cik<l many easp:;; in ;i 11 
attempt to defille \\·hcther damagPs for los:;; of earnings 
are general or :;;pecial damages. Thesr cases <kal pri-
marily \\·ith thP fJlll'stion of plrading, and are not ma-
terial here. In the cases cited by counsel, tlw disti11ctio 11 
becomes important umfor ru]ps of procedure thnt n'-
qnire items of special damages or 1wrmaue11cp of i11 
juries to lw speeifically plea<1P<1. As properly stated r,t 
page 30 of appellant's brief, the purpose of l'l'qnirinl:' 
such pleading is to gi,·e notice to the <1rfr11<lant of thP 
nature and exte11t of the claim so that ht' mig-111 pl'OJH:rly 
prepare his defollse arnl not be taken hy snrprisr. 
In the instant case, there is no claim of impropr·r 
pleading, 11or of an~- surprise 011 the part of cldPwlm1t. 
Plaintiff's amellcled complaint alleges that lie has s11f-
frn'<l lost \\·ages and will colltinue to suff<•r loss of in-
comt>; the deposition of plaintiff which was tnkr1 11 hY 
defelldant prior to trial mid published at the time of trial 
leaYes no clouht as to the nature of plaintiff's dairn:": 
r,nd the pre-trial order specifically states that "it is 1111-
clerstoocl that plaintiff will preseut kstimo11:· eo11ecrn 
ing future loss of wages.'' 
In anal~·zing the Utah cases t1Pali11g "·itli t]J(' <kfii1i-
tion of ge11ernl and s1weial damages, it is ;1ppan'11t. fl' 
appellant has pointed out, that there has hee11 som<' con-
fusion as to 'd1dl1er loss of <·arni11gs is L(<'lll'ral or spt'-
cial clamag-P. Becanse of this m1c·Prtai11t~, it l1as been 
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t!H· prncl iee of many trial courts throughout the state to 
ln1n• the jury consider loss of earnings as an item sepa-
rate arnl apart from the other elements of damage. This 
is what was done in the instant case. Certainly it can-
1101 he contended that loss of earnings, both past and 
fntme, if shown with reasonable certainty, is not a prop-
er e10mcnt of damages in an action for personal injuries. 
RPganllcss of whether loss of earnings are general 
or "Jl<'('ial damage, it woukl not be improper for the trial 
court to rrqnest the jury to make a separate finding on 
this qnrstion as was done here. This would merely have 
the 0ifoct of being a special verdict which is proper un-
der Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 49( a) 
speeifieall)· pro,·i<les that the trial court "may use such 
mdho<l of submitting the issues and requiring the writ-
ten findings thereon as it deems most appropriate." The 
hrni!11Hge of this rule clearly gives wide discretion to the 
trial eourt in determining the form of verdict. In the 
easr of Tl auks v. rhriste11se11, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564, 
t11is eonrt has stated that "it is clf'mentary that there is 
no impropriety in submitting special interrogatories if 
the eourt so desires.'' 
Enn if it wNe to he assumed that it is error for the 
trial eonrt to prrmit a separate finding by the jury for 
loRs of earnings, it could not possibly be prejudicial. The 
fo110\Ying sections from 53 Am. Jnr., Trial, set forth the 
g-Pneral law in this regard: 
Section 1035. ''The responsibility of return-
ing a trne verdict rests with the jury, and it is a 
matter of accommodation, and not a legal require-
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ment, that the trial judge suppl~T the jur~T with the 
proper forms in any given case. Any words which 
convey the meaning and intention of the jury are 
usually deemed to be sufficient. So long as the 
verdict manifests the intention and findings of thr 
jury upon the issues suhmitt0d to them, it will 
not be overthrown because of defects of form 
merely. Certainly irregularities in the form of a 
verdict which do not affect the merits of the con-
troversy constitute no ground for the reversal of 
th0 judgment based upon the verdict.'' 
Section 1036. ''Because inartificial e>xprPR-
sions and words are sometimes employed in fram-
ing a verdict, the first object in the construction 
of a verdict is to learn th0 intrnt of the jury, and 
when this can be asrertain0d, surh 0ffect shonld 
be given to the verdirt, consistrnt with l0gal prin-
ciples and ronstruing it as a who10, as will most 
nearly ronform to the intent. The jury's intent is 
to be arriv0d at by regarding the v0rdict liberally, 
with all reasonable intendments in its support 
and with the sol0 view of asrertaining the menn-
ing of tlw jury, and not under the trrhniral rules 
of construction which are applicable to pleadings. 
In the interpretation of an ambiguous verdict, the 
nourt may make use of anything in th0 prorred-
ings that serves to show with certainty what the 
jur~T intended, and for this purpose, referenre 
may he had, for example, to the pleadings, the 
evidence, the admissions of the parties, th0 in-
structions, or thP forms of v0rdirt submitted." 
Sertion 10;'50. "Although defrrtin' in form, if 
a verdict substantia11y finds the qu0stio11 in issue 
in such a wa~' as "-ill enable tlw rourt intelligent]>' 
to pronou_nre judgm0nt th0reon for one or the 
other party, acrording to tlw manifest intention 
of the jury it is suffieirntly rertain. As is the casr 
generally, every reasona bl0 e011struction should 
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be adopted for the purpose of working the ver-
dict into form so as to make it serve. Further, if, 
by reference to the record, any uncertainty in the 
verdict can he explained, it is sufficient to sustain 
the appropriate judgment." 
If the above principles are applied to the instant case, 
the jury verdict must stand. It is only in the case of un-
certainty, or in the case of the jury considering an im-
proper item of damages, that prejudice could possibly 
result. As to the former, the itemizing of loss of earn-
ings eliminates any uncertainty in that it shows how the 
.inry arrived at the total verdict; as to the latter it has 
been shown that loss of earnings, both past and future, 
11re proper items of damages. 
Rule 61 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with 
the question of harmless error and provides as follows: 
''No error or defect in any ruling or order or in 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is grounds for granting a new 
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disre-
g-ard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties." 
The harmless error rule has been applied to many jury 
,·rrdicts by the Utah Supreme Court. In the case of 
Rhemkc v. Clinton, 2 Utah 230, a verdict of $40,219.26 
was returned by a jury. The jury verdict was ques-
tioned as it contained a large award for interest and the 
rcnlirt was also itemized. The court admitted that the 
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question of interest was a question of law aml not fact, 
but considered the including of interest in the jury ver-
dict as harmless C'fror and stated ''This question as to 
the verdict is one not of substance hut of mere form. 
Under our system of pleading when substantial jnstiep i:-; 
done, the mere form should not defeat it.'' 
rrhe same result ·was reached in the case of A frli iso11 
v. Lee, 8 Kansas 24, 54 Pac. 4. The jury venlict a1)-
peared to contain a double award for pain arnl snff Pri11!~. 
Damages were awarded for pain and suffering, and a]"o 
awarded for mental sufferillg and (listress aml w1•rc• 
itemized. Defense counsel in the case arg1wcl that thcrr 
was a duplication of awarcls. The court held as follow,;: 
"The two items will be treated as <'quin1lent to a 
single allowance for mental and physical pain arn1 
suffering where the same is supported h~- the e,-j_ 
clenre as it was evident that tlw ,iur~- internle(1 to 
allow an award for pain and suffering, both ph~·si­
ral and mental.'' 
'I'hougb the damages wer0 awarded separntel~-, then• \\"<Iii 
no prejudicial error. 
In the cas0 of Clovos v. Home Life l11s11ranre ('0111-
pany of New Yark, 83 Utah 401, 28 P.2d 607, the jury 
awarded a verdict by assessing the plaintiff's damage in 
the sum of $20.00 per month commencing with Sept<•m-
ber 15, 1930, and the jur~· did not state> \\"he>n the the c·om-
pemmtiou should end. The allegation \YnS mack that thP 
verdict was ambiguous and therefore prejmlicial and 111•-
fective. The court hcM that it was harmless error awl 
stated that the eourt could look at tlw p11tire record ~rnd 
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plNHli11gs and from these a judgment on the verdict 
should be mitered for a fixed amount. 
The argument of defendant in this case that there is a 
clnplication in the award is absurd. The jury found 
$;~)0,000.00 losR of earnings and $12,500.00 in other gen-
end damages. If the general damage figure was meant 
to inclnde the loss of earnings, the award for general 
damagc>s could llot have been $12,500.00, hut would have 
had to 0xceecl $::l0,000.00. The instructions given to the 
jm;· properly outlined all of the elements of damage 
l'or "·liich they could permit recovery. It must be as-
smn<'cl that the jury ro11sistecl of intelligent individuals 
and that the>)' followed the instructions of the court. In 
t!JP ease of JVebcr Basin Water Consen·ancy District v. 
Xl'!so11, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81, this court stated that 
presumptions and intendments cannot be indulged in to 
(·stablish a contradiction or inconsistency in the find-
ings or anS\Yers of a jury to special interrogatories, the 
pni.snmption always being to the contrary. The Rame 
pr<',.;umption must be given to the ,·erdict reached by the 
jury in the present case. In the case of Pace v. Parrish, 
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, it was again stated that 
wl1<>nen'r thNe is uncertainty or doubt in connection 
with the correlation of interrogatories with each other 
and their answers, they should he so interpreted as to 
harmonize with the findings of the jury if that can be 
clcnw. 
The awanl of $30,000.00 for loss of earnmgs like-
ll'is(· was not unreasonable in light of the evidence. The 
co1irt in its damage instruction instructed the jury on 
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past and future loss of earnings in the same paragraph, 
so naturally the jury consider0d these i terns together. 
The evi<l0nce established $10,475.00 in past loss of earn-
ings, and the balance of $19,525.00 would constitute fu-
hue loss of earnings. This amount is nominal in light of 
plaintiff's proven loss of earning capacity, his fixed hod-
ily disability, his inability to return to his former type 
of employment, and his life exp0ctancy. Ther0 is no rra-
son or justification whatsoever to interfere with tlw 
verdict of the jury. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FA !LING TO 
STATE A FORl\fULA TO REDUCE FUTURE 
DAMAGES TO PRESENT WORTH. 
Defendant claims error because the court failed to 
give .JIFU instructions No. !10.34 and 90.3;) relating to 
a reductinn of future damages hecause of a present pay-
ment in cash. Again th0 difficult~- with defendant's posi-
tion is that he did not request these instructions to hr 
given. 
Defendant has cited two cases in support of his con-
tention, neither of which is in point. In the case of llatjs 
v. New York Central Railroad Compa11y, 328 Tll. Ap-
peals 631, 67 N.E.2d 215, thr court granted a nrw trial 
on entirely different grounds. In doing so, the court 
commented on several of the jury instructions, among 
which was an instruction relating to the J)l'es0nt valnr of 
future loss, stating that the court shonlcl ha»e givrn 11 
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formula whPl'eby the jury could make the computation. 
The case was not reversed on this ground and the court 
did not say that this error was prejudicial. The ques-
tion of waiver because of no request for an appropriate 
instruction was not even in issue. 
The case of ·wentz v. T. E. Connally, Inc., 45 Wash. 
~d l 27, 273 P.2d 485, was not even a jury trial. In that 
ras<' the court made detailed findings and the award was 
--uhsequently adjusted because the trial court had not 
takl'll i11to corn;icleration the present value of a future 
loss. :\gain the question of waiver was not in issue. 
In the instant case, it would seem that the same au-
tlrnritiPs as cited under Points I and II A. of this brief 
wonlcl 11ow bar defendant from raising this objection 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
D<>fendant "'as given a fair trial m this case and 
has shown no valid reason why the court should award 
a new trial or otherwise interfere with the verdict of the 
jury. rrhe policy of the law is to bring litigation to an 
encl and not to grant new trials merely because one of 
the parties is unsatisfied with the retmlt. 
~\s shown under Point I of this brief, the defendant 
was not deprived of his theory of the case. The instruc-
t iolls, when considered as a whole, show that all of the 
issues were fairly and intelligibly presented to the jury. 
Further, the defendant did not request the trial court to 
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instruct the jury on the specifir ground of negligencr of 
which he now claims to he depriw•d. Ahw, and in any 
event, the evidenee woulcl not su1)port a fim1iug of eon-
tributory negligern·e on th0 ground alleged. 
As shown under Point II of this brief, defornLrnt 
is barred from claiming any error in the form of ver-
dict where he failed to make timely objections thrreto. 
There ·was no error in the form of \'erclict, and even if 
there were error, it would he ha rm less and coulcl not pn"-
sibly be prejudicial. 
Defendant has also waived his right to complain 
about additional instructions which he rlaims slioulcl 
have been given, but \Vhich he <lid not request. 
Based upon all of the foregoing, plaintiff respect-
fully requests that the \'en1iet of the jury arn1 the judg-
ment entered thereon he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, RA \VLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
By NEIL D. ScHAERREn 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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